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HOW THE TALIBAN PREPARE FOR BATTLE?
By M H AHSAN
After the Taliban's successful spring offensive there are calls from Kabul for reconciliation with them, indications from the US and recognition of the fact from Pakistan that without striking a major deal with the Taliban, there can be no peace and stability in Afghanistan.
The Taliban, though, forced out of power by the US-led invasion of 2001 for harboring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, are already planning for next year's offensive, the central aim of which is to retake Kandahar, their previous spiritual capital.
Afghans know their traditions well and are aware that the current insurgency has the ability to turn into a mass rebellion against foreign forces, but most people do not know exactly how this will happen.
HNN traveled deep inside Taliban territory to get some answers.
Huge swaths of the Pashtun heartland in southwestern Afghanistan are now sympathetic to the Taliban-led resistance against foreign troops and the Hamid Karzai-led administration in Kabul. The Taliban have strongholds in most villages and they prove their presence through daily attacks. More than 4,000 people, mostly civilians, are believed to have died in fighting this year, including more than 100 foreign soldiers.
The soul of the southwest is the town of Kandahar, in the province of the same name. All surrounding districts are highly volatile, especially the Panjwai area, the strategic center of the Taliban near Kandahar.
There have only been a few isolated attacks in Kandahar itself, and driving through the city it appears to be very much a stronghold of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO vehicles are everywhere, and when they pass through the main arteries they occupy both lanes to cut off potential suicide vehicles. Taxi drivers and private motorists immediately pull off the road when they see NATO vehicles approaching.
All major roads and intersections are manned by Afghan police and the Afghan National Army. On the surface, Kabul appears to be in full control of Kandahar and its administration under no threat.
Appearances can be deceptive, though.
Abdul Jalil lives in a middle-class neighborhood of Kandahar, although he is regarded as a true son of the soil. He was a middle-ranking official during the Taliban regime of 1996-2001.
After the fall of Kandahar he chose to lie low; when he did visit his family he did so in secret. Over time he started to move around Kandahar more openly, but always declined any renewed association with the Taliban. In the past few months, though, the situation changed dramatically.
"We used to avoid visiting public places. We were afraid of speaking in favor of the Taliban. Now you can see I move all around. I go to the marketplaces and openly introduce myself as a Talib," Abdul Jalil told Asia Times Online at his home, where several other Taliban also live.
But these men are not fighters. They have been assigned by the Taliban's command center in Panjwai district to provide logistical support.
For obvious reasons, Abdul Jalil was not prepared to go into too much detail about precise Taliban activities. But what can be gleaned is that hundreds of others in Kandahar like Abdul Jalil have been drawn back into the ranks of the Taliban.
The main reason for this is the change in mood in the Pashtun areas, from being ambivalent - if not even hostile - toward the Taliban, to fully supporting them.
Almost all the tribes of the Pashtun heartland of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan provinces, the traditional rulers of modern Afghanistan since the 18th century, feel that they are now politically deprived and that the occupying forces do not trust them.
Repeated aerial bombings of civilians have also played right into the Taliban's hands and ordinary people, tired of being innocent targets over the years, now welcome the Taliban's foot soldiers.
Thus people like Abdul Jalil, who had been prepared to abandon the Taliban, are once again active in the movement.
Two of Abdul Jalil's house guests were Mehmood and Hamid, both in their late 20s, about the same age as their host, who appeared to be senior to them in matters related to the Taliban. All three were educated in Kandahar madrassas (seminaries) and, from their appearance, were obviously clerics.
Mehmood and Hamid had been assigned to collect donations from Afghan philanthropists, traders and businessmen and arrange money, satellite-telephone pre-paid cards, blankets, clothes and food for Taliban fighters in various districts around Kandahar and Panjwai.
"Brother, the situation has changed now," said Mehmood. "We go out and ask for contributions for the resistance and come back with our pockets full of money and resources. Some traders have taken on the responsibility of recharging credit in satellite phones and they supply prepaid cards worth Rs3,000 [US$50] every month. Others purchase blankets and jackets, vegetables, meat and flour, and some contribute cash. We supply all this to different fronts."
Hamid and Mehmood pointed out that the restoration of these networks had made the Taliban much more effective, organized and in good morale.
Abdul Jalil is also associated with the Taliban's logistics, but his responsibilities are more tactical in that he is helping prepare for next year's primary objective, the capture of Kandahar, and then in mobilizing all major forces in southwestern Afghanistan to unseat the Kabul government.
For this, Abdul Jalil is well suited. He is trained in guerrilla urban warfare, especially in the use of improvised explosive devices, a skill he learned in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal area.
Abdul Jalil's multiple roles include coordinating between the Taliban and those government officials who are sympathetic to the resistance. He relates how, when he has to travel in high-risk areas, a friendly, highly placed government official from Kandahar takes him in his jeep - complete with official license plates. He adds that much of the material he sources comes from the government.
Commenting on the Taliban's tactics, he said, "We follow the techniques of remote-controlled explosive devices used by the Iraqi resistance. But our technology is different. The Iraqis improvise with various explosive materials and then link it to a remote control.
"Our source of explosives is anti-personal and anti-tank mines. These were in the possession of various warlords who looted them after the fall of the communist government in Kabul [early 1990s]. They either sold or donated the mines to us," said Abdul Jalil.
"These mines are our main source and we link them with remote controls and effectively blow up our targets. But this is not the only source - the other source is American bombs.
"Many of the bombs they drop from the air do not explode. I am an expert in defusing these unexploded bombs, and there are many others like me. We extract all the explosives inside the bomb shells and use them for sacrifice [suicide] attacks," said Abdul Jalil.
Over endless cups of tea, Abdul Jalil, Mehmood and Hamid discussed the various colors of the Taliban-led resistance.
"The Taliban will be ready to mobilize next summer, but the lead role will be played by local tribes and pro-government warlords. All tribes, including the one Hamid Karzai belongs to [Durrani], do not support the Kabul government. The Taliban will be a leader, but the main engine will be dissatisfied tribes and warlords," said Abdul Jalil.
The three men stressed that during the winter lull in fighting, the Taliban would focus on establishing better coordination among their rank and file and in improving their links in the government. Secret arms dumps would also be restocked.
Along with colleague Qamar Yousufzai, we planned to travel to Musa Killa, where, after a prolonged fight and siege by the Taliban, British forces evacuated the area and handed over control to tribal elders.
Abdul Jalil pointed out that the two of us should not travel alone in a taxi. While this correspondent could pass for an Afghan, Qamar looked Pakistani. We therefore decided to share a taxi with several other people.
As soon as we left Kandahar, the driver began playing a cassette tape of Pashtu music. Immediately one of the passengers objected, and demanded that the tape be ejected and his played instead. So we then traveled along to the sounds of Taliban jihadist songs (but with no music) condemning the United States in particular and the West in general.
This was followed by a tape extolling the Prophet Mohammed and attacking cartoons published in the West that ridiculed him. The singer vowed that revenge would be taken by defeating the Americans in Afghanistan.
On the way to Helmand province we passed through several official checkpoints, but the Afghan police didn't check anything, only demanding that the driver pay 10 Pakistani rupees.
"This is not an octroi [toll]. This is pure extortion by the police and we pay because we do not have any option," the driver muttered. The Afghan police do not have a good reputation among the masses. They are notorious for being involved in extortion, and they love to shake down strangers. They are not beyond kidnapping, and even assassination.
As the taxi approached the district of Gerishk and the last police checkpoint before Taliban country, the passenger who had supplied the tapes asked with a smile, "Now tell me, who are you are and why you are going to Musa Killa?"
"I am a journalist and want to see how the Taliban manage their areas and how they operate," I told him, fully aware that he must be Taliban.
"Oh, a journalist ... you mean the people who play with danger. Meet me, I also play the same game," he said with a laugh but without providing his name.
But he was not joking. He turned out to be part of the Taliban structure in Helmand coordinating activities between Taliban strongholds in the province and Taliban pockets in Kandahar city.
The Taliban in Helmand are expected to play a central role in the planned fall of Kandahar. Many top field commanders are already concentrated there and Taliban leader Mullah Omar is expected to spend some time in the province making formal tribal arrangements that will unify all tribes under one pro-Taliban flag.
US President George W Bush failed to achieve twin objectives of fewer restrictions and more troops for Afghanistan at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Riga this week, shifting focus back to Iraq, where he refuses to draw down military forces. The implicit message to Taliban insurgents and their backers: time can erode an already faltering alliance in the long run.
NATO, in its first-ever mission outside Europe, now has about 32,000 troops in Afghanistan battling an unexpectedly robust Taliban across the southern and eastern back country. To the dismay of the United States, Britain, Canada and the Netherlands - member states that have borne the brunt of the fighting - other countries have put caveats on how and where their troops can be operate as militants continue to make headway.
"Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, and drug fighters and criminal elements and local warlords, remain active and committed to destroying democracy in Afghanistan," Bush told assembled leaders. "For NATO to succeed, the commanders on the ground must have the resources and flexibility to do their jobs."
Officials responded that France, Germany, Italy and Spain would ease some deployment restrictions in case of security emergencies, but would not commit troops to fight in hot zones down south. Poland is the only country that has pledged to send extra troops in the new year.
Bitterness is mounting among contributors such as Canada, which provides 2,500 troops and has had to shoulder a disproportionate amount of hostilities in recent months. The two Canadian soldiers killed on Monday by a suicide car bomb in the rebel stronghold of Kandahar raised their contingent's death toll to 36 this year, the majority of which occurred after they moved to southern provinces this summer.
"A country like Canada ... has every right to expect that their allies are at their back, which means if they get into trouble, they can count on support from all of NATO," Daniel Fried, US assistant secretary of state in charge of European and Eurasian affairs, told reporters. He pointedly added that Canada was paying a "hard price" among NATO members.
Germany, for its part, boasts some 2,700 troops in Afghanistan but they remain limited by their own government's mandate to safer northern areas around Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz and Faizabad. Observers say this inconsistency could breed resentment among international forces that must cooperate to beat back the insurgency and fast-track reconstruction. The feared symptom is that public opinion back home vital to sustaining military involvement will gradually sour in a prelude to withdrawal.
Regardless of whether adjustments are made, a regrouped Taliban contingent estimated at 10,000 fighters is prepared to take the fight to "surprising" levels against international forces through the winter and on for as long as it takes to bleed Western resolve. Commander Mullah Obaidullah warned on Thursday that the possibility of more NATO troops "does not worry the Taliban, [but] rather will make it easier for our combatants to attack them".
These are more than fighting words. Suicide and roadside bombings targeting foreign troops and government officials have increased fourfold this year, up to 600 a month, with violence recorded in all but two of the country's 34 provinces. Officials say between 3,700 and 4,000 people have died in insurgent-related violence this year, including at least 186 coalition troops.
"After five years of constantly fighting foreign troops, the Taliban have become a strong military power of the same levels as the most powerful army," said Commander Obaidullah, who insisted that his fighters could carry on for another 20 years if necessary. Standing gun battles between Taliban and NATO forces in Kandahar and Helmand provinces over the summer - the fiercest since the movement's government was toppled by a 2001 US-led invasion - lend some ballast to this claim.
But the Taliban leadership is still banking on asymmetrical tactics founded on historical precedent to oust NATO forces. Two successful, low-intensity campaigns against the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the 1980s have kept geographical advantages fresh in mind. And the lawless Afghan-Pakistani borderlands that have been a sanctuary to the hardline movement and al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden to this day serve as a rear base par excellence.
Mullah Dadullah, another top commander, told Al-Jazeera in a July 2005 interview: "Our tactics are now hit and run; we attack certain locations, kill the enemies of Allah there, and retreat to safe bases in the mountains to preserve our mujahideen."
Pakistan's underhanded support of the Taliban to destabilize its neighbor is no secret in the Western intelligence community, nor is the deep-seated corruption of an Afghan government that includes warlords and other officials with connections to the booming narcotics industry. Afghanistan watchers say all of these factors are interconnected and must be dealt with in unison to rebuild a country shattered by 30 years of war.
But as the United States leads the call for more NATO troops and firepower, critics counter that the Bush administration's overemphasis on military spending versus reconstruction aid has hamstrung efforts to win hearts and minds. By some estimates, military operations have cost US$82.5 billion since 2002, compared with $7.3 billion spent on development - a 900% disparity.
"In Afghanistan, military force, understandably a vital part of a counter-insurgency strategy, has for too long been the only strategy and one that will lose any utility if it is reduced to fighting for 'business as usual'," says the latest report from the International Crisis Group. "The desire for a quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace is what has brought Afghanistan to the present increasingly dangerous situation."
Adding fuel to the fire is record drug output, dubbed Afghanistan's Achilles' heel by US Marine General James Jones, a top NATO general. Narcotics now account for about half of gross domestic product, or $2.7 billion this year, and an even bigger bumper crop is expected in 2007. The Taliban have forsaken their anti-drug stance of the past for arrangements of convenience with trafficking networks and farmers in exchange for kickbacks to fund their insurgency. This allows them to pay well above what the fledgling national army and police can offer.
Amid calls for more robust action to combat the drug trade, US and European efforts thus far have done little to slash production and instead hurt the poor, according to a new United Nations/World Bank report. Farmers of means bribe local-government officials for illicit growing rights, and those lacking money go into debt once their crops are destroyed. In some instances, farmers are compelled to replant poppies to repay outstanding debts; in others, government officials are said to drive out competing cartels for a percentage.
UN investigators say it could take decades to eliminate the problem, while the Taliban appear to be growing stronger by the day.
As one approaches Gerishk district in Helmand province in Afghanistan, one world ends and another begins, marked by the final checkpoint manned by Afghan police before Taliban country begins.
Once through the checkpoint, the road disappears into a vast wonderland that reminds the traveler of the supernatural tales of One Thousand and One Nights and a lifestyle that goes back to when history was not documented.
The vast plains and hills could easily swallow an invading army and watercourses provide natural barriers ideal for ambushes. To make matters worse, the Pashtun tribespeople of the region wear many hats, and they are not afraid to switch them as needs demand, as British troops found out in Musa Qala, a district in the north of Helmand province. The district center is the village of Musa Qala, a grinding four-hour drive from Gerishk.
In the middle of the year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) moved into this region, under the command of British forces. The village of Musa Qala saw fierce fighting between British Pathfinder Platoon troops and the Taliban.
The British were based in the governor's office and faced daily attacks. The British garrison was subsequently relieved by a Danish infantry team, which came under renewed Taliban attacks. After a month, the Danish forces handed control of the base back to British forces, who in mid-October left the village.
They had struck a deal with the Taliban and handed over everything to pro-Taliban tribal elders. Now the area is free of NATO forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and is a strategic back yard for the Taliban from where revenue is generated and disbursed, arms stockpiled and pro-Taliban forces regrouped.
Until just a few months ago, various independent warlords held sway in the countryside, and with impunity they abducted journalists, foreign workers and other professionals. They usually demanded ransom, or simply killed their captives.
Under the Taliban, outsiders are as likely to be apprehended, but they will face a tribal council to be tried as spies. If found guilty, they will have their heads cut off.
The same goes for informers. As this is a Taliban stronghold, they want to build up and protect their resources as much as possible in preparation for next year's spring offensive. Similarly, they want to eradicate any anti-Taliban elements. Suspected informers are given a summary trail and then publicly executed by having their throats slit with a knife.
These gruesome killings are filmed and then burned on to compact discs, which are widely distributed. Images are even spread by mobile telephone as a chilling reminder for those who work for the administration of President Hamid Karzai in Kabul.
"These executions and the modus operandi are both justified. Because of these informers US aircraft bombed us and killed hundreds of innocent people. So there was a need for a powerful message to be send around," Haji Naimatullah told Asia Times Online.
Haji Naimatullah, in his 50s, is a one-legged Taliban commander who cut his teeth fighting against the Soviets in the 1980s. More recently, he fought against the British in Musa Qala, sustaining a serious injury to his leg.
The first thing one notices in the village of Deh Zor in the Musa Qala district is bits of British army equipment hanging from trees. According to the locals, a relief convoy of British troops was sent to Musa Qala at the height of the battle in that town.
The convoy had traveled unimpeded - although closely watched - until it arrived at Deh Zor. There, Taliban fighters were waiting behind a wall running along a field. The convoy came under heavy fire and, according to the villagers, about 50 troops were killed and their bodies hung from trees. There they remained for several days until the deal was struck with the Taliban for the British to leave Musa Qala. The bodies were then reclaimed, with some kit left behind. The event is still the talk of the town, but it was apparently never reported in the press.
Once the British, the police, the ANA and the Kabul-installed administration departed, there was no police force, no formal administration or courts in Musa Qala - only the tribal elders.
"Despite lacking such infrastructure, we have had a pretty good time in comparison to the past," Abdul Nabi told Asia Times Online. Abdul Nabi owns a "hotel" - one of several rudimentary unnamed establishments in Abdul Nabi where the guests sleep together in a large room and where such basics as running water and flushing toilets are light-years away.
"Life was made miserable by the Afghan police and the ANA," Abdul Nabi said. "They extorted money, robberies were common and it was impossible to travel anywhere after dark without being looted. There were many incidents of abduction of small boys and even girls. The Afghan police and the army were behind the crimes.
"The public reaction was natural and they stood up against them. But then US aircraft bombed the area and NATO forces and the ANA tried to suppress the uprising. Every day, we found many bodies in front of our hotel and dragged them into the premises.
"Finally, the Taliban took to the battlefield. The whole town was emptied and British troops and the Taliban dug in against each other. Afghan forces chased the Taliban everywhere, even into our hotel, and took away all valuables during raids. The Taliban won and the foreigners left the area.
"The people of the town then returned to Musa Qala, but now, without the police and the army, peace prevails. Robberies have come to a halt. There are no cases of abduction, and not any cases of sodomy," said Abdul Nabi.
This completes a full circle for Musa Qala. As in other areas in Helmand province, the people of Musa Qala happily said goodbye to the Taliban when the US drove them from power in 2001, and they welcomed the installation of the US-backed Karzai administration in Kabul. The tribespeople discouraged the Taliban from turning to guerrilla warfare, and asked them to leave if they did not want to live peacefully.
All the people wanted to do was go about their business, which happened to be poppy cultivation. This the Taliban had, for the most part, prevented them from doing.
But the Americans, too, would not allow the poppies to bloom again, although they did offer compensation, either in money or other means. All that came, though, was plenty of noxious spray to kill the plants.
Two years ago, the Taliban tried to set up a base in Musa Qala, but they lacked the grassroots support to sustain their resistance struggle and left the area. Now they are the uncrowned kings. Taliban commander Haji Naimatullah explains how this happened.
"As soon as the Taliban retreated from Kabul and Kandahar [in 2001] and the Karzai administration was in place, a new setup was established in Helmand province as well. I was the Taliban's commander in Musa Qala, and I was told I would have to pay bribes to the new governor or face dire consequences.
"So I left the area and took refuge in Akhtak village [in the Baghran district of the province] situated in rugged mountains. The people of the area were just not with us. Then, in the past few years, the people witnessed for themselves what little development work had been done in the area.
"There were a few other events which turned everything against the Karzai administration. The major event was in 2003 when the governor of Helmand province, Sher Mohammed, came after Taliban fighters in Akhtak village. Out of 80 people killed during the raid, most were civilians. So the people of the village demanded compensation from the governor.
"Members of the tribal jirga [council] also made the same demand to the governor, who agreed - but nobody was paid anything. There were other incidents like this where the government made promises but never kept them.
"As a result, the people turned to the Taliban again and under the command of Mullah Abdul Manan the Taliban laid siege to the base of the British forces in Musa Qala on July 17," said Haji Naimatullah.
The former British base was near the main market. The Taliban sent all the townspeople away and dug in in nearby shops and houses. The fighting was intense. All the mosques in the town were bombed, as well as many houses suspected of being safe havens of the Taliban. The shops still standing are pockmarked from bullets.
"The fighting and the siege were so prolonged that everybody was sick and tired, especially the British troops, who could find no way to get out, and they were sweating without many supplies. Finally, a deal was struck between the local tribes and the Karzai-backed administration of Musa Qala that neither the Taliban nor the Karzai administration would run the district. Instead, tribal elders would nominate neutral people and they would run the district," Haji Naimatullah said.
In reality, though, the area is now fully manned and controlled by the Taliban. They have come down hard on crime, but they allow people to grow poppies. Indeed, in all parts of Helmand where the Taliban hold power, the poppies flourish.
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INSIDE STORY
