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CORNERED AFTER KARACHI
By C RAJA MOHAN
Recent tumultuous developments in Karachi suggest Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has lost none of his famed tactical genius. The enduring problem for Musharraf, who is said to have served with some distinction in Pakistan’s special forces, has been his poor strategic judgement.
His move to pit the Muttahida Quami Movement, which rules the roost in Karachi and is currently an ally of the army, against the Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry’s planned rally on Saturday was brilliant to the extent that it could have left the army smirking at a political class tearing itself apart.
In any confrontation there is always the unexpected. The 40 deaths, the count on Monday evening, from the violent clashes leave no room for a political compromise in the current confrontation between the army and the popular opposition led by the lawyers. The Karachi deaths, arising from a brazen manipulation against popular will, can only deepen the popular anger against Musharraf and the army.
If he had understood the dangers of his manoeuvre, Musharraf would not have gloated that the ‘people of Pakistan’ were with him and accused Chaudhry for provoking the Karachi violence. Karachi has in all probability ruined what was to have been a triumphant year for Musharraf, when he was to be re-elected president for a second term, with his uniform on. He may yet force that decision on the current electoral college, consisting of the present assemblies. He might still have his uniform on, but his political legitimacy would be in shreds.
Musharraf’s mistake in assuming that Chaudhry would meekly walk away from his job after he was fired is easily explained. After all power breeds arrogance. But his errors amidst the unfolding crisis since March have been part of a consistent pattern. Having run Pakistan with some aplomb and to great initial enthusiasm at home and fawning international support after the events of September 11, 2001, Musharraf has now entered the twilight of his political career. What no one can predict is when nightfall might be.
Political change, when it occurs in Pakistan, could be rapid and discontinuous. Well into the crisis in March, pundits and diplomats were predicting that the judicial crisis would be little more than a storm in the tea cup. And that the army could easily divide a weak and squabbling political opposition.
To be sure, army rule in Pakistan always looks strong and unshakeable. But it is also rather brittle and cracks easily when pressure is applied in the right direction and at the appropriate moment. In 1977, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto seemed invincible after a rigged election. Within weeks of a political agitation against him, Bhutto found himself in a prison to be hanged a couple of years later.
Discontinuity was also the essence of his successor General Zia-ul Haq’s departure. In August 1988, Zia had ridden a storm of popular protest for the restoration of democracy and was all set to celebrate the triumph in helping the Americans oust Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Zia literally vanished into thin air after his aircraft blew up. It was an incident that was never fully explained.
Popular will in Pakistan is easily under-estimated. To be sure, it is not often that Pakistanis come out on to the streets against their governments, especially those led by the army. Protest movements in Pakistan might not have succeeded in producing systemic change, but have often induced regime change, as Ayub Khan in 1969 and Bhutto in 1977 found to their cost.
As important as the fact that there is a popular movement against Musharraf today is the political resonance it is eliciting in Punjab. No one can rule Pakistan without the political acquiescence of the Punjabi elite. The entirely unexpected and effusive welcome to Chaudhry last week in Lahore should be a disconcerting political signal to Musharraf. The other Chaudhrys, Shujaat Hussain, the president of the PML-Q, and Pervez Elahi, the chief minister of Pun jab, who have managed the province for Musharraf all these years have been extremely nervous since the judicial crisis began.
American support has always been one of the pillars of army rule in Pakistan. After nearly six years of generous and unstinted support from the Bush administration, there is growing unease in Washington at Musharraf’s inability to control the Pak-Afghan border. The US, however, has so heavily invested in Musharraf that it is by no means certain that Washington is ready to trade him for another leader. The US would surely want to extract the maximum possible services from Musharraf before letting him twist in the wind.
The latest ‘breakthroughs’ in the war against the Taliban could well be Musharraf’s offerings for continued US support. He could also be banking on the US to deliver Benazir Bhutto. That deal done some time ago might have done wonders for Musharraf by sharply dividing the political opposition. After Karachi, such a deal might only help engineer a revolt from Benazir’s supporters.
Beyond Lahore and Washington, it is the army’s corps commanders who hold the key to Musharraf’s political future. The tricky question for Pakistan’s de facto board of governors is to figure out if the corporate interests of the army and Musharraf’s second term with uniform on are one and the same. Whichever way they vote, the outcomes will be rather difficult to manage — for the crisis in Pakistan, more starkly than ever before, is a systemic one.
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INSIDE STORY
